



15.482 Healthcare Finance

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Unit 1, Part 3: Buying Cures vs Renting Health

Unit Outline

- Market Efficiency
- The Time Value of Money
- Valuing Special Cashflows
- Inflation

Valuing Special Cashflows

Application: Expensive Therapies



Application: Expensive Therapies

- There's a difference between price-gouging and genuine breakthrough therapies
- Example: hepatitis C
- 12-week treatment cures it!
 - Cost of liver transplant: \$577,000 in 2011
 - Value of statistical life: \$9.1 million \times 2/3?
- But 3 million U.S. patients have hepatitis C!



Application: Expensive Therapies

Sovaldi Is A Bargain, But The Cost Impact Is Huge!

- Suppose we “mortgaged” Sovaldi?

$$\$84,000 = \frac{P}{r/12} \left[1 - \frac{1}{(1 + r/12)^{12n}} \right] \Rightarrow P = \frac{\$84,000 r/12}{1 - \frac{1}{(1+r/12)^{12n}}}$$

Monthly Payment

Years	Interest Rate				
	1%	3%	5%	10%	15%
1	\$7,038	\$7,114	\$7,191	\$7,385	\$7,582
5	\$1,436	\$1,509	\$1,585	\$1,785	\$1,998
10	\$736	\$811	\$891	\$1,110	\$1,355
15	\$503	\$580	\$664	\$903	\$1,176
30	\$270	\$354	\$451	\$737	\$1,062

Application: Expensive Therapies



WE ACCEPT THESE MAJOR CREDIT CARDS



Now Pool Health Care Loans:

- Create SPEs, tranches, securitization, i.e., CDOs
- CDS to guarantee senior tranche
- Tap into debt markets

Application: Expensive Therapies

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PERSPECTIVE

HEALTH ECONOMICS

Buying cures versus renting health: Financing health care with consumer loans

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A crisis is building over the prices of new transformative therapies for cancer, hepatitis C virus infection, and rare diseases. The clinical imperative is to offer these therapies as broadly and rapidly as possible. We propose a practical way to increase drug affordability through health care loans (HCLs)—the equivalent of mortgages for large health care expenses. HCLs allow patients in both multipayer and single-payer markets to access a broader set of therapeutics, including expensive short-duration treatments that are curative. HCLs also link payment to clinical benefit and should help lower per-patient cost while incentivizing the development of transformative therapies rather than those that offer small incremental advances. Moreover, we propose the use of securitization—a well-known financial engineering method—to finance a large diversified pool of HCLs through both debt and equity. Numerical simulations suggest that securitization is viable for a wide range of economic environments and cost parameters, allowing a much broader patient population to access transformative therapies while also aligning the interests of patients, payers, and the pharmaceutical industry.

currently reduces the cost of these therapies.

Others have suggested that individual consumption through government (6), but thus far, no one has proposed for implementing the funds to pay for present such a proposal. The viability of HCL therapies using portfolio engineering techniques is not clear.

The motivation for an outright market failure is the concept of inefficiently allocated resources that can only be corrected through government intervention. Existing institutions already have contracts that provide to consumers for a wide range of medical expenses, but consumer loans already exist.

PERSPECTIVE




Fig. 2. Assumptions used in the simulations. (A) The cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the annual household income for patients with chronic HCV (blue line and left axis) and the estimated expected default probability as a function of income for three different scenarios (right axis). (B) The CDF of annual default probability, in the baseline scenario, for multiple incomes as well as the whole patient population (income >\$35,000). The numbers in parentheses denote the expected default probability associated with that category. (C) The U.S. Census Bureau's projected numbers for the baby-boomer generation as well as our estimated postmedication survival curve for each patient (16). (D) The annual probability of death based on the survival curve in (C) over the 9-year HCL term.

Senior tranche: **2.1%**
 Junior tranche: **2.5%**
 Equity tranche: **12.5%**

Who Pays?

In The Very Long Run, Taxpayers

- That's what government is for

In The Long Run, Insurers

- That's what health insurance is for

In The Short Run, Patients, Families, Foundations

- That's what consumer loans and charities are for
- Mortgaging your health is offensive
- Letting patients die is even more offensive